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City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.:
Court-Approved Censorship Through
Zoning
I.

Introduction

On February 25, 1986, in an opinion which only served to
further obfuscate the already muddy waters surrounding applicable standards of judicial review for legislation which imposes
on constitutionally-protected fundamental rights, the United
States Supreme Court handed down its decision in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.1 The Renton decision marks another attempt by the Court to balance the power of a municipality to impose zoning regulations aimed at improving the quality
of life in a community against the right to freedom of expression
guaranteed by the first amendment. 2 Moreover, Renton marks
the first time that the Court has upheld the constitutionality of
an ordinance which is content-based on its face, which seeks to
restrict constitutionally-protected expression, and which effectively imposes a total ban on the restricted expression. In this
regard, the Renton decision is inconsistent with previous Supreme Court decisions.
In Renton, the Court upheld a zoning ordinance which prohibited adult movie theaters' from locating within 1000 feet of
1. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
2. Prior to Renton, the leading case in which the Court was faced with this same
issue was Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In Young the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Detroit ordinance which prohibited adult
movie theaters from locating within 1000 feet of any two other "regulated uses" (i.e.,
bars, cabarets, and adult bookstores, as well as adult theaters) or within 500 feet of a
residential area. Id. at 52. The Renton majority viewed the decision in Young as controlling. 106 S. Ct. at 928. See also Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981)
(zoning regulation excluding all live entertainment from borough but allowing a variety
of other commercial uses held invalid under first and fourteenth amendments); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1980) (San Diego sign ordinance imposing a general ban on off-site billboards and limiting the content of on-site billboards
to commercial messages held violative of first amendment).
3. The Renton ordinance broadly defines an adult movie theater as any enclosed
structure used for the presentation of films, video cassettes, cable television, or any other
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any residential area, single or multiple-family dwelling, church,
park, or school.4 According to the Court, the Renton ordinance
was merely a form of time, place, and manner regulation, aimed
not at restricting expression but rather at the "secondary effects" of adult movie theaters on the surrounding community.
Part II of this Note examines in detail the legal background
against which Renton was decided, including permissible and
impermissible restrictions on speech and the distinction between
content-based and content-neutral regulation of speech. Part III
reviews the factual background of Renton and sets forth both
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion and Justice Brennan's
forceful dissent.6 Part IV analyzes the reasoning behind those
opinions and suggests that the Court has significantly relaxed
those standards of judicial review traditionally held to be applicable to legislation which imposes restrictions on constitutionally-protected speech.7
In Part V, this Note concludes that, even assuming that the
Renton ordinance was properly viewed as content-neutral, it
fails to satisfy the four criteria for determining the constitutional validity of a content-neutral regulation set forth in
United States v. O'Brien,' and, therefore, should have been

visual media "distinguished or characteri[zed] by an emphasis on matter depicting,
describing or relating to 'specified sexual activities' or 'specified anatomical areas'.., for
observation by patrons therein." 106 S. Ct. at 927 (citation omitted).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 928, 929.
6. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court; he was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justice Blackmun concurred without opinion. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Marshall joined.
7. Since the challenged ordinance in Renton may properly be viewed as a subjectmatter restriction (i.e., a regulation imposed on the basis of subject matter, but not on
the basis of message content), and since subject-matter restrictions are neither clearly
content-based nor content-neutral, Part IV of this Note examines the Renton ordinance
under both content-based and content-neutral standards of review. See infra notes 23-26
and accompanying text.
8. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien Court set forth a four-part analysis for determining the constitutionality of a content-neutral regulation which indirectly restricts
speech. Id. at 377. First, is the regulation within the constitutional power of the government to enact? Second, does the regulation further a substantial or compelling governmental interest? Third, is the asserted governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression? Fourth, are the incidental restrictions on first amendment
freedoms no greater than necessary to effectively further the asserted governmental interest? Id. See infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text. The tests for determining the
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struck down by the Court. This Note rejects the Court's "secondary effects" rationale as a justification for regulations which
impose restrictions on expression based on the subject matter of
that expression. This Note also concludes that the Renton Court
failed to adequately examine the City's motives for enacting the
challenged ordinance, and that the Court erred by failing to require that the City establish that the ordinance was in fact
aimed at furthering some substantial governmental interest.
The danger of the Renton decision is that it heralds a movement away from imposing any meaningful standard of judicial
scrutiny on legislation which intrudes on fundamental first
amendment freedoms. Instead, the Court seems to be headed towards a deferential, "rubber-stamp" approach to this kind of
legislation. In Renton, the Court effectively abandoned previously-delineated tests for determining the validity of a constitutionally-challenged ordinance." Such an approach constitutes little more than tacit Court approval of governmental censorship
through manipulation of a municipality's zoning power.
II.
A.

Background

The ConstitutionalRight at Stake

The seeds of the Renton controversy date back to 1791 and
the adoption of the Bill of Rights. The first amendment reads, in
pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the
freedom of speech." 10 Although the express language of the first
amendment addresses only congressional action, it was held to
apply to state and local actions as well in Gitlow v. New York. 11
Because the freedom to communicate one's ideas without government interference or censorship is held to be so essential to
the democratic ideal, legislation which tends to restrict this freedom has traditionally received the strictest scrutiny from the
constitutionality of a content-based regulation are even more demanding. "[Wlhether
the Court evaluates such [content-based] restrictions by an 'absolute protection' approach, a 'clear-and-present-danger' test, a 'compelling government interest' standard, or
some other formulation, it clearly applies a different and more stringent standard to
content-based than to content-neutral restrictions." Stone, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 196-97 (1983).
9. For examples of such tests, see supra note 8.
10. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
11. 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
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Supreme Court.

In its role as the final interpreter of the Constitution' 3 the
Supreme Court has been called upon many times to more precisely define the scope of first amendment protections. "[A]bove
all else," claimed Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous
Court' in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 5 "the First
Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content."' 6 Continuing his broad interpretation of the first
amendment, Marshall wrote:
To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and
to assure self-fulfillment for an individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content
would completely undercut the "profound national commitment
public issues should be uninhibto the principle that debate on
7
ited, robust, and wide-open.'

While Marshall's opinion in Mosley has been criticized as somewhat of an overstatement,1 8 it properly identifies the "essence"
of the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech as a prohibition of government regulation based on the content of the
restricted speech.

12. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
13. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
14. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist concurred in the result without opinion. Chief Justice Burger concurred separately in a single paragraph. See infra note 18.
15. 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (ordinance permitting some but prohibiting other types of
picketing in certain areas on the basis of content held violative of first amendment).
16. "Although this declaration has proved to be somewhat overstated, the Court has
been remarkably true to its word, for except when low value speech is at issue, the Court
has invalidated almost every content-based restriction that it has considered in the past
quarter-century." Stone, supra note 8, at 196 (footnotes omitted).
17. 408 U.S. at 95-96 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)) (emphasis added).
18. Chief Justice Burger concurring in Mosley warned that "some of the language
used in the [majority's] discussion of the First Amendment could, if read out of context,
be misleading .... [Tihe First Amendment does not literally mean that we 'are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship.' This statement
is subject to some qualifications .... " 408 U.S. at 102-03 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See
supra note 16.
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Four years after Mosley, in Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 9 the Court sharpened its definition of what constitutes impermissible "content control" by the government. "The
essence of that rule [prohibiting regulation based on the content
of protected speech] is the need for absolute neutrality by the
government," wrote Justice Stevens. "[Ilts regulation of communication may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the
point of view being expressed by the communicator. 0 The "absolute neutrality" language of Young served to leave the door
open for government regulation of speech based on the subject
matter of that speech, so long as that regulation was viewpointneutral.2"
Though the Young Court treated a Detroit zoning ordinance
requiring that adult movie theaters be dispersed throughout that
city, rather than concentrated in limited areas,2 2 as essentially
content-neutral, the Court in general has been less than consistent regarding whether to treat such subject-matter distinctions
as content-based or content-neutral.23 Since regulations which
impose restrictions on an entire category of speech differentiate
essentially on the basis of content, such regulations may prop-

19. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
20. Id. at 67. The quoted passage appears in Part III of the Court's opinion. Stevens
was joined in Part III by only Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist;
Justice Powell declined to join in Part III, and filed a separate opinion concurring in
part. Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented.
21. Viewpoint-neutrality is a less rigorous requirement than content-neutrality. For
example, suppose that State A enacts an ordinance prohibiting political speech on public
streets. Since the ordinance defines the restricted speech on the basis of its content (i.e.,
its "political" nature), it cannot meet the strict requirement of content-neutrality. However, since the ordinance is silent with regard to any particular viewpoint expressed in
the prohibited political speech (i.e., it does not ban only "liberal" or only "conservative"
political speech), it fulfills the requirement of viewpoint-neutrality. Subject-matter restrictions, simply stated, are those which differentiate on the basis of content, but not on
the basis of viewpoint. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
22. The Detroit ordinance defined adult movie theaters based on the "character" of
the films exhibited in those theaters. According to the ordinance, an "Adult Motion Picture Theater" is "[an enclosed building .. .used for presenting material distinguished
or characterized by the emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified
Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas' [defined elsewhere in the ordinance]
for observation by patrons therein." 427 U.S. at 53 n.5.
23. "[Subject matter restrictions do] not fit neatly within the Court's content-based/
content-neutral distinction .... Such restrictions are directed, not at particular ideas,
viewpoints, or items of information, but at entire subjects of expression." Stone, supra
note 8,at 239.
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erly be viewed as content-based.2" However, if the essence of the
first amendment proscription on the abridgement of speech is
merely the need for "absolute neutrality" on the part of the government (as per Young), then a regulation which imposes restrictions on an entire field of speech without regard for any
particular point of view expressed therein, is properly viewed as
content-neutral.2 5 The significance of this otherwise purely academic exercise is this: if the regulation is content-based, then
strict scrutiny will apply; if the regulation is viewed as contentneutral, then a less stringent standard of judicial review will
apply.2"
Where strict scrutiny applies, a challenged regulation must
be the least restrictive means of effectively furthering a substantial or compelling governmental interest in order to pass constitutional muster. Strict scrutiny carries with it a presumption of
unconstitutionality; the burden of overcoming that presumption
falls on the government or other authority responsible for
promulgating the challenged regulation.2 7 The Court has also defined several less stringent standards of review. Under an "intermediate" standard of review, a challenged regulation must be

24. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Public Service Commission,
447 U.S. 530 (1980) (regulation prohibiting utility from inserting in monthly bills literature discussing controversial public policy issues held violative of first amendment);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (ordinance prohibiting drive-in
theaters from exhibiting films containing nudity struck down on first amendment
grounds); Mosley, 408 U.S. 92.
25. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (prohibition of political speech on military bases upheld by Court); Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (prohibition
of political advertising on city-owned buses upheld by Court).
26. Professor Stone explains why the subject-matter issue has "baffled" the Court:
The confusion generated by subject-matter restrictions is hardly surprising, for
such restrictions fall between viewpoint-based and content-neutral restrictions,
sharing some of the characteristics of each. On the one hand, subject-matter restrictions are directed, not at particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information,
but at entire subjects of expression. They are thus less likely than viewpoint-based
restrictions to distort public debate in a viewpoint-differential manner, to implicate constitutionally disfavored justifications, or to be the product of improper
motivation. On the other hand, subject-matter restrictions are expressly directed
at particular subjects. They are thus narrower than content-neutral restrictions,
and more likely than content-neutral restrictions to threaten the concerns underlying the content-based/content-neutral distinction.
Stone, supra note 8, at 240-42 (footnotes omitted).
27. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 530-31
(1986).
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substantially related to an important governmental interest. 28
Finally, where "mere rationality" is determined to be the appropriate standard of review, a regulation will survive if it bears
some minimal rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
29
interest.
B.

Permissible Content-Based Restrictions on Speech

Despite the presumption of unconstitutionality usually accorded content-based regulations by the Court,30 there are several types of situations in which such content-based regulations
will usually be upheld.3 ' The Court has long held, for example,
that certain kinds of speech are "unprotected"; that is, they derive no security from the language or spirit of the Constitution.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,2 the Court, per Justice Murphy, stated:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words - those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any expression of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.3
In 1957, the Supreme Court specifically held that obscenity
"was not within the area of constitutionally-protected speech. ' 34
Sixteen years later, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,3 5 the
Burger Court elaborated on that position, claiming that regula28. Id. at 531-32.
29. Id. at 530.
30. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 & n.7 (1980) (statute prohibiting some
but permitting other kinds of picketing on the basis of content held violative of first
amendment); Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 98-99.
31. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 582 (1978).
32. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
33. Id. at 571-72.
34. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (state and federal obscenity statutes upheld against claims that first amendment protects obscene materials).
35. 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (first amendment allows state regulation of obscene films exhibited at adult movie theaters).

7

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:251

tion of obscene materials serves legitimate state interests in
maintaining "the quality of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and
possibly, the public safety itself." s The test for determining
whether particular expressive activity qualifies as "obscene" was
developed in Miller v. California s3 a companion case to Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.
The Miller obscenity test calls for a weighing of three interrelated inquiries. First, would an "average" person,3 8 applying
contemporary community standards, 39 find that the expression,
taken as a whole, appeals to the "prurient interest"? 40 Second,
does the expression depict or describe, in a "patently offensive"
way, 41 sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law? Finally, does the expression, taken as a whole, lack serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value? 4 2 Material which
qualifies as obscene expression under Miller is not entitled to
first amendment protection;' 3 content-based regulation of this
material is, therefore, constitutionally permissible."
Even where the regulated speech is otherwise constitutionally protected, content-based regulations will be upheld where
those regulations can survive examination under a standard of

36. Id. at 58.
37. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (mailing of materials determined to be obscene not protected
by first amendment).
38. The Court added meat to the bones of the Miller obscenity test several years
later, in Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977). "[O]bscenity," said the Smith
Court, "is to be judged according to the average person in the community, rather than
the most prudish or the most tolerant." Id. at 304.
39. "[C]ommunity standards... provide the measure against which the jury decides
the questions of appeal to prurient interest and patent offensiveness." Id. at 302.
40. The Roth Court defined "prurient interest" as a morbid or lascivious (but not a
normal) interest in sex. 354 U.S. at 487 & n.20.
41. In Miller, the Court characterized the "patently offensive" as that which "goes
substantially beyond customary limits of candor and affronts contemporary community
standards of decency." 413 U.S. at 31.
42. Id. at 24.
43. Note, however, that the Miller Court viewed their three-pronged test as limiting
"obscene" expression to hard-core pornography. Id. at 27.
44. In other words, since material determined to be obscene under Miller derives no
protection from the first amendment, a state may regulate or even prohibit such material
without running afoul of the Constitution. Since the restricted material is unprotected,
the state need not meet even the minimal requirements of "mere rationality." See supra
note 29 and accompanying text.
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strict judicial scrutiny; that is, content-based regulations on
speech are permissible if they are narrowly-tailored to effectively
further an overriding or compelling governmental interest.4 5 In
such cases, a "heavy burden of justification" is on the state to
show that the challenged regulation is the least intrusive means
of achieving the asserted compelling state interest."' The reviewing court in each case must effect an ad hoc "balancing test"
approach, weighing the extent of the restriction on speech
against the importance of the governmental interest at stake.
In ConsolidatedEdison Company of New York, Inc. v. Public Service Commission,47 the Supreme Court, per Justice Powell, explained the necessity of strict judicial scrutiny for contentbased regulations. "[W]hen regulation is based on the content of
speech, governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully
to ensure that communication has not been prohibited 'merely
because public officials disapprove the speaker's views.' "48 Applying that standard of review, the Con Ed Court invalidated a
New York Public Service Commission order prohibiting public
utility companies from enclosing in monthly bills inserts which
49
discuss controversial issues of public policy.
When the Court, then, perceives a regulation to be clearly
content-based (and not within the "gray area" of subject-matter
restrictions"0 ), it will properly evaluate that regulation under the
"bright light" of strict judicial scrutiny. 5' The state will then be
required to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality
properly accorded legislation which infringes on fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.2

45. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
46. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973) (strict
scrutiny generally appropriate where fundamental constitutional rights are at stake, or
where regulation is based on a "suspect" classification, such as race).
47. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
48. Id. at 536 (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
49. Id. at 544.
50. See supra note 23.
51. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. 205; Mosley, 408 U.S. 92.
52. Professor Stone comments on the more rigorous standards clearly imposed by
the Court in reviewing content-based regulations: "whether the Court evaluates such restrictions by an 'absolute protection' approach, a 'clear-and-present danger' test, a 'compelling government interest' standard, or some other formulation, it clearly applies a
different and more stringent standard to content-based than to content-neutral restric-
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Content-Neutral Restrictions on Speech

Traditionally, regulations which are clearly content-neutral
(again, and not within the "gray area" of subject-matter restrictions 53) have proven to be less difficult for the Court to uphold.
Still, a regulation which is content-neutral is subject to judicial
review if it imposes indirect burdens on speech.5" According to
Professor Stone:
The Court's primary concern in the content-neutral realm is that
such restrictions, by limiting the availability of particular means
of communication, can significantly impair the ability of individuals to communicate their views to others. This is, of course, a central first amendment concern, for to the extent that content-neutral restrictions actually reduce the total quantity of expression,
they necessarily undermine the "search for truth," impede meaningful participation in "self-governance," and frustrate individual
"self-fulfillment." 55
The appropriate level of judicial review applicable to content-neutral regulations which impose indirect burdens on
speech may be difficult to accurately ascertain." It is generally
agreed, however, that the Court applies a somewhat more lenient standard of judicial review to content-neutral than to content-based regulations.57
tions." Stone, supra note 8,at 196-97. See also Redish, The Content Distinction in First
Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 121 (1981) (noting that "proponents of the
content distinction advocate considerably stricter levels of judicial review for contentbased than for content-neutral regulations").
53. See supra note 23.
54. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961) (a majority of the Court (5-4)
upheld California's denial of bar admission to an applicant who had refused to answer
questions about Communist Party membership).
55. Stone, supra note 8, at 192-93 (footnotes omitted).
56. The Supreme Court has developed a number of different tests (whose criteria
overlap significantly) for determining the constitutionality of content-neutral regulations
which impose indirect burdens on speech. The most popular of these approaches is the
four-part analysis developed in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See
infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text. The waters are muddied even further by the
applicationof these tests by the Court in various cases. Though the tests generally suggest some "intermediate" standard of review for content-neutral regulations, the Court
in practice appears to fluctuate between this middle level of scrutiny and an even lessdemanding "mere rationality" standard of review for determining the constitutionality of
content-neutral regulations. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
57. While both Stone and Redish recognize that the Court has traditionally applied
a more stringent standard of judicial review to content-based regulations and a more
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With regard to the level of scrutiny due content-neutral regulations, some jurists argue for the existence of a "hierarchy of
First Amendment values."' 8 This position, which has not yet
won majority support in the Supreme Court, claims that the judiciary may assign relative social value or importance to a particular kind of speech and protect (or deny protection to) such
speech in accordance with its assigned value.59 In Young v.
American Mini-Theatres, Inc.,60 Justice Stevens, in a section of
his opinion in which he was joined by only three Justices, 1
stated unequivocally that non-obscene erotic expression should
enjoy a lesser degree of first amendment protection than should
political speech.
Even though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some
auguably artistic value, it is manifest that society's interest in
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire's immortal comment. Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to
despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our
duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us
would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the
citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the
theaters of our choice. Even though the First Amendment prbtects communication in this area from total suppression, we hold
that the State may legitimately use the content of these materials
as the basis for placing
them in a different classification from
6 2
other motion pictures.

lenient standard of judicial review to content-neutral regulations, however, Redish denies
the utility of this distinction. Redish proposes a unified approach with a single "compelling interest" standard used to determine the constitutionality of both content-based
and content-neutral regulations. Redish, supra note 52, at 150.
58. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (FCC may properly sanction radio stations broadcasting profane, indecent, or obscene material).
59. Moreover, the "social value" of speech may vary according to the surrounding
circumstances. Similarly, the constitutional protection afforded "low value" speech may
vary, depending on the context. Id. at 747-48.
60. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 20.

62. 427 U.S. at 70-71 (emphasis added). "Voltaire's immortal comment," referred to
by Stevens, is: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to
say it." S. TALLENTRYE, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907), quoted in Young, 427 U.S.
at 63.
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The corollary of this hierarchical approach to speech values may
well be a diminution in the degree of judicial scrutiny applicable
to regulations of speech which is, in the eyes of the Court, of low
63
social value.
The most frequently used test for determining the constitutionality of content-neutral regulations that indirectly restrict
freedom of speech was developed in 1968 in United States v.
O'Brien.4 As early as 1939, however, the Court recognized the
need for an O'Brien-type approach. Justice Roberts, writing for
the majority in Schneider v. State,65 noted that:
Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify . . . [regulation
which] diminishes the exercise of rights . . . vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced
in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of [first amendment] rights."
The Court has held the O'Brien test applicable to zoning regulations which impose incidental restrictions on first amendment
67
rights.
In its purest form, the O'Brien test weighs the answers to
four distinct but interrelated questions to determine whether a
content-neutral restriction on speech is permissible under the
Constitution. First, is the regulation within the constitutional
power of the government to enact?"' Second, does the regulation

63. But see Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514-15 (1981) (city
may not distinguish between the relative values of different categories of non-commercial
speech and thereby choose "appropriate subjects for public discourse").
64. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (statute punishing willful destruction of draft cards upheld
against claim that draft card burning is symbolic speech protected by the first
amendment).
65. 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (government's interest in preventing littering held insufficient to justify a ban on the distribution of leaflets).
66. Id. at 161.
67. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 804-05 (1984) (ordinance prohibiting posting of signs on public property upheld,
using O'Brien criteria).
68. This initial inquiry is so basic and so rarely dispositive of any real issue that
many jurists (and many scholars) simply ignore it.
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further a substantial or compelling governmental interest? 9
Third, is the asserted governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of free expression? 0 Fourth, is the incidental restriction on first amendment freedoms no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the asserted governmental interest?7
Despite its apparent simplicity, the O'Brien test may actually raise more questions than it answers. For example, what
constitutes a governmental interest properly characterized as
"substantial," "compelling," "subordinating," "paramount," "cogent," or "strong"?7 2 To what extent must the state demonstrate
that such an interest actually exists?7 3 Are the second and
fourth tiers of the O'Brien analysis to be considered independently, or must the Court consider "whether the asserted governmental interest [tier two] is sufficiently 'substantial' to justify
the 'incidental' impact on free expression [tier four] "?7" Does
this latter approach effect an ad hoc balancing, similar to what
is required for judicial review of content-based regulations? 75 Or
are the O'Brien criteria merely a ritual for "rubber-stamping"
regulations which intrude on fundamental rights guaranteed by

69. Properly read, this second tier of O'Brien actually raises two issues. First, is the
asserted governmental interest "substantial" or "compelling"? Second, does the regulation in question actually serve to further that interest? If this second half of the two-tier
inquiry is ignored by the Court, fundamental rights may fall to a regulation substantially
unrelated to its purported goal.
70. The third tier of the O'Brien analysis ensures that there is no "hidden agenda"
lurking behind an innocuous-looking regulation - i.e., that the asserted governmental
interest is not merely a pretext for allowing the state to unconstitutionally regulate or
restrict speech.
71. 391 U.S. at 377.
72. Id. at 376-77. "To characterize the quality of governmental interest which must
appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial;
subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong." Id.
73. Again, the issue here is the possibility of pretext. See supra note 70. Is it enough
for the state to simply say that their interest is real and substantial, or must it affirmatively show the existence of such an interest (i.e., through studies identifying the state's
particular problem, or by presenting evidence of an overall plan or scheme designed to
further the alleged state interest)?
74. Redish, supra note 52, at 127.
75. Recall that, where a regulation is viewed as content-based and where the speech
restricted is not unprotected speech, see supra text accompanying note 32, the regulation
will be constitutionally permissible only if it is narrowly-tailored to effectively further an
overriding or compelling state interest. A reviewing court must weigh the extent of the
restriction on speech against the importance of the governmental interest at stake. See
supra text accompanying note 27.

13

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:251

the Constitution? At least one critic of the content restriction

thinks

SO.

78

III.
A.

City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.

The Facts

Renton, Washington, is a small city with a population of
32,000 people located approximately fifteen miles southeast of
Seattle. In May of 1980, the Mayor of Renton addressed the
Renton City Council and requested that it consider enacting
zoning legislation specifically addressed to the regulation of
"adult entertainment uses." This request was made notwithstanding the fact that no such uses existed in Renton at that
time. 18
The City Council referred the matter to Renton's Planning
and Development Committee for further consideration. The
Planning and Development Committee held public hearings on
the subject of adult entertainment in Renton,7 and "[wihile
none of this testimony was ever recorded or preserved, a city
official reported that residents . . . objected to having adult
movie theaters located in their community."8 0 The committee
also purportedly considered the recent experiences of Seattle 1
and other cities 2 with regard to adult entertainment uses.8 3 Additionally, the committee received a report from the City Attorney's Office advising it of pertinent developments in other
76. See Redish, supra note 52, at 127 (inefficacy of O'Brien analysis for contentneutral regulations).
77. 106 S. Ct. 925, 927 (1986).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 935 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Notably, the city official referred to was
"unable to recount any testimony as to how adult movie theaters would specifically affect
the schools, churches, parks, or residences 'protected' by the ordinance." Id.
81. See Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978)
(adult theater zoning ordinance, supported by extensive research on City's part regarding
effects of adult theaters on surrounding communities, upheld), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946
(1979).
82. See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
83. 106 S. Ct. at 927. Justice Brennan, however, writing in dissent in Renton,
claimed that the City "never actually reviewed any of the studies conducted by [Seattle
or Detroit]." Moreover, Renton had no basis for determining whether the Seattle or Detroit findings were "relevant to Renton's problems or needs." Id. at 936 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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cities."4
Meanwhile, the Renton City Council adopted Resolution
No. 2368, which imposed a general moratorium on the licensing
of businesses engaged primarily in the selling, renting, or exhibition of sexually explicit materials.8 5 The resolution was enacted
to prevent the severe negative impact such adult entertainment
uses would presumably have upon surrounding business and
residences."
In April, 1981, the City Council enacted Ordinance No.
3526, a zoning regulation prohibiting any adult movie theater
from locating within 1000 feet of any residential area, single or
multiple-family dwelling, church, or park, or within one mile of
any school.8 7 (Later, the City Council amended Ordinance No.
3526 to reduce the minimum distance allowable between an
adult movie theater and any school to 1000 feet.88 ) The ordinance referred only to adult movie theaters; it did not extend to
adult bookstores, topless bars, massage parlors, or any other potentially deleterious adult entertainment uses. According to the
ordinance, an adult movie theater was any "enclosed building
used for presenting motion picture films, video cassettes, cable
television, or any other such visual media, distinguished or
characteri[zed] by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing
or relating to 'specified sexual activities' or 'specified anatomical
areas'. . . for observation by patrons therein."89 The effect of the
newly-enacted zoning ordinance was to eliminate approximately
ninety-five percent of the total land area of the City of Renton
as potential sites for adult movie theaters."0
In early 1982, Playtime Theatres, Inc. acquired two existing
84. 106 S. Ct. at 927.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. For additional information on the interim amendment process, see infra note
99 and accompanying text.
89. 106 S. Ct. at 927.
90. Id. at 938 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that at trial the district court found that the Renton ordinance left approximately 520 acres, or about five
percent of the total land area of the City of Renton, available for adult theater sites.
Justice Brennan also noted, however, that "because much of this land was already occupied, '[l]imiting adult theater uses to these areas is a substantial restriction on speech.'"
Id. (quoting Playtime Theatres, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 534 (9th Cir.
1984)).
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theaters in downtown Renton with the intention of using them
to exhibit adult motion pictures.9 1 The exhibition of such films
in the two theaters was proscribed, however, by Ordinance No.
3526. Playtime Theatres, Inc. filed suit against the City of Renton in Federal District Court for the Western District of Wash-.
ington, alleging that the zoning ordinance regulating the location
of adult movie theaters was in violation of the guarantees of the
first 9 2 and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.9 4 In addition, Playtime Theatres, Inc. sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against enforcement of the ordinance. After obtaining a
preliminary injunction from the district court,e5 Playtime Theatres, Inc. began exhibition of adult films at its two theaters in
downtown Renton.9 6
B. ProceduralHistory
Shortly after Playtime Theatres, Inc. began exhibiting adult
films in its two Renton theaters, both parties agreed to submit
the case to the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Washington for a final decision regarding whether a permanent
injunction against enforcement of the ordinance should issue.7
By this time, the City had amended the challenged ordinance in
several important respects, reducing the minimum distance permissible between an adult movie theater and any school to 1000
feet, 98 and adding a statement of reasons for enactment of the
ordinance. 9
91. 106 S. Ct. at 927.

92. The first amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
93. The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
94. 106 S. Ct. at 927.
95. Id. The action was referred to a federal magistrate, who recommended the entry

of a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 3526. The magistrate also recommended the denial of the City's motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment. The district court adopted all of the magistrate's recommendations. Id.
96. Id.

97. Id. at 927-28.
98. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
99. 106 S. Ct. at 927. Note that when the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice
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The district court vacated the preliminary injunction, denied Playtime Theatres, Inc.'s request for a permanent injunction, and entered summary judgment for the City. 00 The district
court found, inter alia: that the challenged ordinance did not impose substantial restrictions on speech; 0 1 that the City was not
required to demonstrate "specific adverse impact on Renton
from the operation of adult theaters," but could reasonably rely
on the experiences of other cities with regard to adult theaters;10' that the purposes of the Renton ordinance were unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 10 3 and that the restrictions on speech were no greater than necessary to further
the asserted substantial governmental interests.' 0 ' These findings clearly indicate that the district court relied on its interpretation of the four-part analysis developed in United States v.
05
O'Brien1
to declare the Renton ordinance constitutionally

sound.' 06
On appeal by Playtime Theatres, Inc., the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district
court.'0 7 Also relying on the test set forth by the Supreme Court

Brennan, writing in dissent, expressed concern over the "suspiciously coincidental timing" of the interim amendments, adopted while the case was still before the district
court. Brennan also expressed doubts as to the reliability of the City Council's "findings"
(incorporated within the amendments) with regard to the "secondary effects" of adult
movie theaters on the surrounding community. Id. at 935-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. 106 S. Ct. at 928.
101. Id. The district court found that the ordinance left approximately 520 acres, or
about five percent of the total land area of Renton, available for adult theater uses.
Those 520 acres, according to the court, consisted of "'[a]mple, accessible real estate,'
including 'acreage in all stages of development from raw land to developed, industrial,
warehouse, office, and shopping space that is criss-crossed by freeways, highways, and
roads.'" Id. at 932 (citation omitted). But see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
103. 106 S. Ct. at 928. The district court concluded that the Renton ordinance was
aimed
not at the content of the films shown at "adult motion picture theaters," but
rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community.
The District Court found that the City Council's "predominate concerns" were
with the secondary effects of adult theaters, and not with the content of adult
films themselves.
Id. at 929 (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 928.
105. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
106. 106 S. Ct. at 928.
107. Playtime Theatres, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984).
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in O'Brien,0 8 the court of appeals held: that the Renton ordinance in fact constituted a substantial restriction on speech; 109
that the City could not properly rely on the experiences of other
cities in lieu of specific evidence with regard to the effects of
adult theaters on Renton;'" that the City failed to adequately
demonstrate the existence of a substantial or compelling governmental interest;"' and that the City did not sufficiently show
that its asserted interests were in fact unrelated to the suppression of free expression."' The court of appeals remanded the
case to the district court for reconsideration of the City's asserted substantial governmental interests, and the City subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court."1 3
C.

The Supreme Court Opinions
1.

The Majority

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority, led by Justice Rehnquist,"1 4 reversed the judgment of the court of appeals
and held the Renton ordinance to be constitutionally sound." 5
The majority based its decision largely upon Justice Stevens'
opinion in Young v. American Mini-Theatres,Inc."' Relying on
108. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
109. 748 F.2d at 534. The court of appeals concluded that little if any of the remaining purportedly "available" land was suitable for adult movie theaters; therefore, the
ordinance imposed a substantial restriction on this type of expression. Id.
110. Id. at 537. The court of appeals ruled that, in the absence of studies specifically
relating to "the particular problems or needs of Renton," the justifications advanced by
the City were "conclusory and speculative," and, therefore, wholly insufficient to sustain
the ordinance under O'Brien. Id. at 537-38.
111. Id. at 537. The City's failure to prove the existence of the necessary substantial
or compelling governmental interest is at the heart of the court of appeals' opinion in
this case. Significantly, the court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for
reconsideration of this issue in spite of the other findings of the court of appeals which
clearly indicated the impermissibility of the ordinance under O'Brien. Id. at 537-38. See
supra notes 69 & 73.
112. 748 F.2d at 537. The court of appeals held that, if "a motivating factor" in
enacting the ordinance was to restrict first amendment rights, then the ordinance is unconstitutional, no matter how small a part such motivating factor may have played in the
City's decision and no matter how many other constitutionally acceptable motivations
entered into the decision-making process. Id. (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 538.
114. See supra note 6.
115. 106 S. Ct. at 932-33.
116. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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Young, the Renton majority first held that, since the ordinance
does not impose a total ban on adult movie theaters, it is prop7
erly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation."1
The majority then noted that such time, place, and manner regulations are constitutionally permissible if "they are designed to
serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication."""
Moreover, the Renton majority, although recognizing that
"the Renton ordinance . . . does not appear to fit neatly into
either the 'content-based' or the 'content-neutral' category,""19
agreed with the district court that the City Council's
"predominate concerns" were with the secondary effects of adult
movie theaters on the surrounding community, and not with the
content of the films themselves."10 Consequently, the Court held
that, since the City's pursuit of its zoning interests is wholly unrelated to the suppression of free expression, the ordinance is
"justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech,""' and, therefore, is properly viewed as contentneutral."'
The Renton majority further held that the challenged ordinance was in fact designed 123 to serve a substantial governmen117. 106 S. Ct. at 928.
118. Id. Note the softening of the language of the original criteria used in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). For a discussion of the O'Brien criteria, see
supra notes 69, 71 and accompanying text. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1975) (statute prohibiting
pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices held to be violative of first amendment, applying criteria similar to those used in O'Brien). Instead of demanding whether
the ordinance "furthers an important or substantial governmental interest," Justice
Rehnquist frames the inquiry as whether the ordinance is "designed to serve a substantial governmental interest" (emphasis added). Similarly, Justice Rehnquist asks not
whether "ample alternative channels for communication [are left open]," but rather
whether the ordinance "unreasonably limit[s]" such alternative channels. 106 S.Ct. at
928. These distinctions are subtle but important, as is evidenced by the outcome in this
case.
119. 106 S. Ct. at 929. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
120. 106 S. Ct. at 929. The Court noted further that "Itihe ordinance by its terms is
designed to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and
generally 'protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial
districts, and the quality of urban life,' not to suppress the expression of unpopular
views." Id. (citation omitted).
121. 425 U.S. at 771.
122. 106 S. Ct. at 929.
123. See supra note 118.
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tal interest, i.e., the preservation of the quality of life in the
community.1 24 The Court recognized that the ordinance was enacted without the benefit of studies conducted by and for the
City of Renton, and relating specifically to Renton's particular
problems and needs. However, the majority held that the City
could reasonably rely on the experiences of other cities and on
the studies conducted in those other cities in drafting its own
12 5
adult theater zoning ordinance.
The First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting
such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence
independent of that already generated by other cities, so long as
whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to
be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.' 2 6
The Court found the method 2 7 chosen by the City to advance its substantial interests (i.e., concentration of adult movie
theaters in given areas, rather than their dispersion throughout
the City) to be constitutionally permissible. 128 Additionally, the
majority rejected the theater owners' claim that the ordinance
fails for "underinclusiveness.' 2 9 Although the ordinance regulates only adult movie theaters and places no restrictions whatsoever on other "adult" businesses,13 0 the majority explained
that:
There is no evidence that, at the time the Renton ordinance was
124. 106 S. Ct. at 930.
125. Id. at 930-31. The City was ostensibly relying here on the experiences of two
other cities in particular: Seattle and Detroit. See Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle, 90
Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
126. 106 S. Ct. at 931.
127. The fact that Renton ultimately chose a different method of adult theater zoning than that chosen by either Seattle or Detroit (the cities upon whose studies Renton
purportedly relied in drafting its own adult theater zoning ordinance) was held by the
Renton Court to be constitutionally irrelevant. Id.
128. Id.
129. "Underinclusiveness" occurs when legislation which classifies for the purpose of
correcting some evil or social problem only affects a fraction of the class actually causing
that problem. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 341, 347-48 (1949). In Renton, the adult theater owners argued that the ordinance
fails for underinclusiveness because it singles out adult movie theaters for regulation
while leaving other equally deleterious "adult" uses, such as adult bookstores, topless
bars, and massage parlors, unregulated. 106 S. Ct. at 931.
130. 106 S. Ct. at 931.
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enacted, any other adult business was located in, or was contemplating moving into, Renton. In fact, Resolution No. 2368, enacted in October 1980, states that "the City of Renton does not,
at the present time, have any business whose primary purpose is
the sale, rental, or showing of sexually explicit materials." That
Renton chose first to address the potential problems created by
one particular kind of adult business in no way suggests that the
city has "singled out" adult theaters for discriminatory treatment. We simply have no basis on this record for assuming that
Renton will not, in the future, amend its ordinance to include
other kinds of adult businesses that have been shown to produce
the same kinds of secondary effects as adult theaters.'
Finally, the Renton majority held that the challenged ordinance allows for reasonable alternative channels for communication of the restricted expression.' 2 The 520 acres of remaining
available land in Renton, untouched by the strictures of the
adult theater zoning ordinance, were found by the majority to
consist of "[aimple, accessible real estate."1 33 The majority rejected Playtime Theatres, Inc.'s contention that little if any of
this land is in fact "available" to them, and that the ordinance
effectively bans adult movie theaters in Renton.' 3 ' The Court
concluded that the inequities of an open real estate market
hardly give rise to a first amendment violation,' 5 that "the First
Amendment requires only that Renton refrain from effectively
denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the city," and that Renton's adult
theater zoning ordinance "easily meets this [constitutional]
requirement."' 3 6

131. Id. at 931-32 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 932.
133. Id. The Court simply accepted the findings of the district court on this point.
See supra note 101.
134. 106 S. Ct. at 932.
135. Id. The majority, in a near-belligerent tone, stated that, "although we have
cautioned against the enactment of zoning regulations that have 'the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to lawful speech,' we have never suggested that the
First Amendment compels the Government to ensure that adult theaters ... will be able
to obtain sites at bargain prices." Id. (citations omitted).
136. Id.
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The Dissent

Justice Brennan, writing in dissent in Renton, 11 7 advanced
two separate arguments as to why the challenged ordinance is
clearly unconstitutional under the first amendment.1 38 First,
Justice Brennan argued, the ordinance is content-based, and,
therefore, is not properly analyzed as a content-neutral time,
place, and manner restriction on speech.1 39 That an ordinance
may in fact be directed at the secondary effects of adult movie
theaters on a surrounding community does not "magically"
transform that ordinance from a content-based into a contentneutral regulation. 140 Moreover, wrote Justice Brennan,
"[b]ecause the ordinance imposes special restrictions on certain
kinds of speech on the basis of content, I cannot simply accept
. . . Renton's claim that the ordinance was not designed to suppress the content of adult movies."'
Justice Brennan reasoned that, because the ordinance is
content-based, the City's motives for enactment "must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not been
prohibited 'merely because public officials disapprove the
speaker's views.' """ He rejected the "secondary effects" justification offered by the City and unquestioningly adopted by the
majority, arguing that:
Other motion picture theaters and other forms of "adult entertainment," such as bars, massage parlors, and adult bookstores, are not subject to the same restrictions. This selective
treatment strongly suggests that Renton was interested not in
controlling the "secondary effects" associated with adult businesses, but in discriminating against adult movie theaters based
137. Id. at 933-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was joined in the dissent by Justice Marshall.
138. Id. at 933.
139. Id. at 933-34. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (content-based
regulations), and notes 64-76 and accompanying text (content-neutral regulations).
140. 106 S. Ct. at 933-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan has regularly
opposed the Court's treatment of subject-matter restrictions as content-neutral on the
theory that such restrictions are neutral with regard to the particular viewpoint being
expressed. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 316 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 23-26.
141. 106 S. Ct. at 934 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
142. Id. (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
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on the content of the films they exhibit.'43

The dissent criticized the "suspiciously coincidental timing"
of the City's amendments to the challenged ordinance, 1 " and
noted that many of the City Council's. alleged "findings" (with
regard to the secondary effects of adult movie theaters on surrounding communities) contained therein constitute little more
than "expressions of dislike for the subject matter. 1 4 Justice
Brennan added that these "findings," made without benefit of
research studies or expert testimony on the issue, are not really
"'findings' at all, but purely speculative conclusions." ' ,"Finally,
Justice Brennan rejected the majority's conclusion that Renton
was entitled to rely, without more, on studies conducted in other
cities 4 7 in drafting its own adult theater zoning ordinance. 4 8
Justice Brennan's second argument in dissent claimed that,
even if the Renton ordinance is properly viewed as content-neutral, it is still unconstitutional under the standards previously
established by the Supreme Court. 14 9 Relying on the test set
forth in Heffron v. InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.""° (a variant of the O'Brien analysis' 51 ), Justice Bren143. 106 S. Ct. at 934 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In the same context, Justice Brennan also commented on the City's failure to justify treating adult theaters differently
from other, equally deleterious "adult" businesses. This "underinclusiveness," Justice
Brennan claimed, "is cogent evidence that [the Renton ordinance is] aimed at the content of the films shown in adult movie theaters." Id. at 934-35 (emphasis in original). See
supra note 129 and accompanying text.
144. 106 S. Ct. at 935 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. Justice Brennan adopted the opinion of the court of appeals on this point. Id.
(quoting Playtime Theatres, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 537 (9th Cir. 1984)).
146. 106 S. Ct. at 936 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. See supra note 125.
148. 106 S. Ct. at 936 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to Justice Brennan:
[Elven assuming that Renton was concerned with the same problems as Seattle
and Detroit, it never actually reviewed any of the studies conducted by those cities. Renton had no basis for determining if any of the "findings" made by these
cities were relevant to Renton's problems or needs .... Renton cannot merely rely
on the general experiences of Seattle or Detroit, for it must "justify its ordinance
in the context of Renton's problems - not Seattle's or Detroit's problems."
Id. (quoting Playtime Theatres, 748 F.2d at 536) (emphasis in original) (footnotes
omitted).
149. 106 S. Ct. at 933, 937 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (ordinance placing restrictions on solicitation within state
fairgrounds upheld). See also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288 (1984) (prohibition against sleeping in public parks held not to violate first amendment rights of demonstrators who wanted to sleep in parks as a form of symbolic
expression).
151. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
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nan argued that the Renton ordinance is neither precisely drawn
to "serve a significant governmental interest" nor designed to
"leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
the [restricted] information. ' 152 Again, Justice Brennan pointed
to the City's failure to demonstrate through independent research that the challenged ordinance actually furthers some substantial governmental interest.1 53 Additionally, Justice Brennan
claimed that the ordinance "is invalid because it does not pro15 4
vide for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.
The 520 acres untouched by the Renton ordinance, Justice
Brennan contended, is largely unavailable land or land wholly
unsuited for adult theater uses.1 55 According to Justice Brennan,
the theater owners are not asking that the City "guarantee lowprice sites for their businesses, but seek only a reasonable opportunity to operate adult theaters in [Renton]. By denying them
this opportunity, Renton can effectively ban a form of protected
speech from its borders. ' 156 Such a result, claimed Justice Bren1 5
nan, is clearly unconstitutional.
IV.

Analysis

While it is manifestly clear that the first amendment does
not guarantee the right to communicate any idea at any time, in
152. 106 S. Ct. at 937 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Heffron v. International
Society for Krishna Conciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981)).
153. 106 S. Ct. at 937 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan claimed that the
Renton ordinance is "clearly distinguishable" from the Detroit ordinance upheld in
Young (which was "supported by the testimony of urban planners and real estate experts
regarding the adverse effects of locating several such businesses in the same neighborhood") and from the Seattle ordinance upheld in Northend Cinema (which "was the
'culmination of a long period of study and discussion' "). Id. (quoting Northend Cinema,
90 Wash. 2d at 711, 585 P.2d at 1154-55).
154. 106 S. Ct. at 937-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. Justice Brennan adopted the opinion of the court of appeals on this issue. Id.
at 938 (citing Playtime Theatres, 748 F.2d at 534).
156. 106 S. Ct. at 938 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For the majority's treatment of Renton's obligation to make available land for adult theater uses, see notes 135-36 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan's reference to adult films as "protected speech" emphasizes the fact that the City never contended that the restricted expression was
obscene and therefore was not protected by the first amendment. See supra notes 32-44
and accompanying text.
157. 106 S. Ct. at 938 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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any place, or in any manner desired, it is equally clear that the
first amendment does guarantee the right to be free from governmental censorship. By upholding the challenged zoning ordinance in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,' 5a the Supreme Court has defied this most basic constitutional precept
and swung the door open wide for governmental censorship, albeit censorship realized through nice manipulation of established, necessary, and otherwise legitimate administrative pow6
ers.15
Censorship, however, is no less menacing because it is
subtly imposed; indeed, a mundane veneer renders it all the
more insidious.
The judiciary has long recognized the danger of majoritarian
censorship and has worked to develop a variety of tests designed
to check governmental censorship without interfering with legitimate and necessary governmental functions. 6 0 Variations on a
"balancing test" theme (i.e., balancing the importance of the
governmental interests at stake against the extent of the restrictions on speech) have yielded a number of different analyses for
both content-based and content-neutral restrictions, as well as
for restrictions which are neither clearly content-based nor content-neutral.1 6 The success of these tests for constitutional validity, however, turns largely on their application. Applied superficially, these tests are ineffectual as checks against
governmental censorship; they merely pay "lip service" to the
guarantees of the first amendment, and amount to little more
than a "rubber-stamping" of governmental attempts to censor
through legitimate administrative powers.
In Renton, the Court failed to properly apply the tests on
which it purportedly relied in upholding the adult theater zoning ordinance at issue in that case. 6 2 The Renton ordinance,
which regulates the location of adult movie theaters on the basis
of the content of the films exhibited therein, should have been

158. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
160. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also supra
notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
162. The Renton Court apparently applied a somewhat "watered down" version of
the O'Brien test for content-neutral regulations to uphold the adult theater zoning ordinance at issue. 106 S. Ct. at 928, 930. See supra notes 64-76, 118 and accompanying text.
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analyzed as a content-based restriction on speech requiring
strict judicial scrutiny. Moreover, even assuming that the ordinance was properly viewed by the Court as content-neutral, it
still should have failed under a proper application of the fourpart O'Brien analysis. 1 3 Finally, the Renton Court's deference
to the City in upholding a zoning ordinance which effectively
bans adult movie theaters in that city was wholly inappropriate
in light of the paramount importance of the constitutional right
at stake in that case.
A.

Content-Based Regulations and Strict Judicial Scrutiny

Renton's adult theater zoning ordinance is properly viewed
as a content-based restriction on constitutionally protected
speech, and, therefore, requires review under a standard of strict
judicial scrutiny. Though the ordinance is neutral with regard to
any particular viewpoint being expressed, it defines the restricted theaters by the subject matter of the films exhibited
therein.1 4 While debate continues over whether to treat such
subject-matter restrictions as content-based or content-neutral,'65 the Court has often recognized the especial need to protect potentially "offensive" speech from majoritarian censorship.
"[W]hen the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the
ground that they are more offensive than others, the First
Amendment strictly limits this power."16 6 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Renton ordinance must be viewed as
an attempt to "shield the public" from "offensive" speech; it,
therefore, merits a more stringent standard of review than would
16 7
a "true" content-neutral restriction on speech.

163. See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (subject-matter restrictions).
165. See supra note 26.
166. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (emphasis added).
167. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court stated:
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse
solely to protect others from hearing it is . . .dependent upon a showing that
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to
silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.
Id. at 21.
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Despite some arguments to the contrary 6 ' - arguments
which have never won majority support in the Supreme
Court'6 9 - it is evident that the type of speech restricted by
the Renton ordinance (i.e., non-obscene' 70 erotic expression)
comes entirely under the first amendment umbrella. Adult movies, at least in the absence of a showing that they are properly
characterized as "obscene" expression,' 7 ' derive as much protection from the first amendment as do other forms of entertainment. In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,'72 the Supreme
Court stated unequivocally that "[e]ntertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment,
such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the First
1 73
Amendment guarantee. 1
As Justice Stewart, writing in dissent in Young v. American
Mini-Theatres, Inc.,' 74 observed, "[I1t is in those instances
where protected speech grates most unpleasantly against the
sensibilities that judicial vigilance must be at its height.'1 75 The
inherent wisdom of this warning becomes apparent in a case like

168. See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63-73 (1976) (Justice
Stevens argued for a "hierarchy of First Amendment values" which would afford erotic
expression a lesser degree of first amendment protection than would be afforded political
or ideological expression); see also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
169. Even in Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., Stevens mustered only a plurality for that portion of his opinion in which he proposed his theory of a "hierarchy" of
protected speech. See supra notes 20 & 168.
170. Recall that the City made no showing that the restricted expression was "obscene" and, therefore, did not derive protection from the first amendment. See supra
note 156.
171. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
172. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
173. Id. at 65. See also Winter v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (noting that
"[t]he line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of
th[e] basic right [of free speech]"); Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F.2d 1260, 1264 n.4 (9th Cir.
1983) (standing for the proposition that "free expression intended for entertainment
purposes is generally entitled to the full panoply of first amendment protections").
174. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
175. Id. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart continued:
The Court must never forget that the consequences of rigorously enforcing the
guarantees of the First Amendment are frequently unpleasant. Much speech that
seems to be of little or no value will enter the marketplace of ideas, threatening
the quality of our social discourse and, more generally, the serenity of our lives.
But that is the price to be paid for constitutional freedom.
Id. at 88.
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Renton, where the character of the restricted expression apparently robbed it of all constitutional protection in the eyes of a
not-so-vigilant Court, allowing a government to justify imposing
a virtually total ban on such expression with only the flimsiest
evidentiary support.1 7 6 In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,17 7 the Supreme Court recognized that "[t]here is an 'equality of status in the field of ideas,' and government must afford
all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. ' 178 The
Renton Court seems to have abandoned this ideal.
Properly analyzed as a content-based restriction on wholly
protected speech, then, the Renton ordinance must be narrowlytailored to effectively further a substantial or compelling governmental interest in order to pass constitutional muster. 179 To
overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality attending such
content-based regulations,1 8 the City is required to demonstrate
that its asserted interests are, in fact, "overriding" or "compelling," that the challenged zoning ordinance effectively furthers
these interests, and that the ordinance restricts no more speech
than is necessary to effectively further the asserted governmental interests.18 i
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,8 2 the City
produced no real evidence (i.e., no independent studies, no expert testimony) either tending to show the existence of a substantial governmental interest or demonstrating how the challenged ordinance effectively furthers that interest. Moreover, the
district court found that the ordinance eliminates ninety-five
percent of the total land area of Renton as potential sites for
adult movie theaters, 83 and some question still exists as to

176. Recall that the City neither conducted independent research nor heard any expert testimony on the secondary effects of adult theaters on Renton before enacting the
challenged zoning ordinance. 106 S. Ct. at 935 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
178. Id. at 96 (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE

27 (1948)).

179. See supra text accompanying note 26.
180. See supra text accompanying note 27.
181. These three steps represent a standard, ad hoc "balancing test" approach for
judicial review of content-based restrictions on speech. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
182. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
183. Id. at 932.
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whether any of the remaining five percent is actually available
for adult theater uses. 84 Balancing the lack of evidentiary support on the City's part against the extent of the restriction on
protected expression, it is clear that the Renton ordinance
should have been struck down as violative of first amendment
rights.
B. Content-Neutral Regulations and the Applicable Standards of Review
Even if Renton's "subject-matter based" adult theater zoning ordinance is properly analyzed'8 5 as a content-neutral time,
place, and manner restriction on speech, 86 it still fails under the
four-part test set forth in United States v. O'Brien.'7 In essence, the O'Brien inquiry considers whether the regulation is
within the constitutional power of the government to enact,
whether the regulation furthers a substantial or compelling governmental interest, 8 8 whether the asserted governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression,' 8 ' and
whether the incidental restriction on first amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the asserted
governmental interest."90 The next sections consider each of the
four tiers of the O'Brien analysis in turn."'1
184. Id. at 932, 938.
185. Recall that subject-matter restrictions may be viewed either as content-based
or as content-neutral, depending somewhat on the predilection of the Court. See supra
notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
186. 106 S. Ct. at 929-30.
187. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 69.
189. See supra note 70.
190. 391 U.S. at 377.
191. Some commentators question the utility of "relaxing" standards of judicial
scrutiny for content-neutral restrictions on speech:
The most effective means of avoiding indirect suppression of particular viewpoints
... is closely to scrutinize all content-neutral regulations. And the most appropriate method available to the judiciary to avoid indirect suppression of ideas is to
assure itself of the compelling nature of the government's asserted noncontentrelated justification for the restriction.
Redish, supra note 52, at 133 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original). Redish proposes
abandoning the content distinction in favor of a unified approach to judicial scrutiny of
government regulations which place restrictions on first amendment freedoms. While
such an approach may prove to be overly restrictive of governmental actions, the idea of
requiring greater assurance of the "compelling nature" of the governmental interests at
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The Zoning Power

It is well-established that a city may impose zoning regulations as part of the valid exercise of its police powers. 92 However, at least "where protected First Amendment interests are at
stake, zoning regulations have no. . . 'talismanic immunity from
constitutional challenge.' "193 In Schad v. Borough of Mount
94
Ephraim,1
Justice White, writing for the Court, noted:
The power of local governments to zone and control land use is
undoubtedly broad and its proper exercise is an essential aspect
of achieving a satisfactory quality of life in both urban and rural
communities. But the zoning power is not infinite and unchallengeable; it "must be exercised within constitutional limits." Accordingly, it is subject to judicial review; and [in most cases], the
standard of review is determined by the nature of the right assertedly threatened or violated rather than by the power being
exercised or the specific limitation imposed." 5
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the Schad decision, commented that "the presumption of validity that traditionally attends a local government's exercise of its zoning powers carries
little, if any, weight where the zoning regulation trenches on
rights of expression protected under the First Amendment."'9 0
He added that, in such a case, "the zoning authority must be
prepared to articulate, and support, a reasoned and significant
1 97
basis for its decision.
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,19 8 the City acted within its constitutional limits when it set out to create the
adult theater zoning ordinance at issue in that case. The first
tier of O'Brien, i.e., whether the regulation is within the constistake is particularly attractive. This concept, however, may well be found in a proper
reading of the four-part test proposed in United States v. O'Brien. See infra notes 24045 and accompanying text.
192. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041, 1450 (5th ed. 1979) ("police
power" and "zoning").
193. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 77 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (quoting Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 75 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring)).

194. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
195. Id. at 68 (citations omitted).
196. Id. at 77 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

197. Id.
198. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss1/7

30

1986]

RENTON

tutional power of the government to enact, is, therefore, satisfied. The zoning power, however, is subject to several important
limitations, 9 9 all of which are addressed in the remaining portions of the O'Brien analysis.
2.

Substantial Governmental Interests

The second O'Brien inquiry is whether the challenged regulation furthers a substantial or compelling governmental interest.2 0 0 As noted earlier, a literal reading of this second tier demands a two-step analysis. 201 First, has the government
adequately demonstrated that such a substantial or compelling
governmental interest actually exists? Second, has the government shown, at least superficially, that the challenged regulation
furthers the asserted substantial governmental interest? The
key to both these "sub-inquiries" is the requirement of some evidentiary support on the part of the government.
This evidentiary support need not be absolute, but it "must
consist of more than '[c]onclusions alone.' Rather, there must be
'a factual basis for [the government's] conclusion that this kind
of [zoning] restriction will have the desired effect.' ,202 In Renton, the Court appears to waive this requirement, choosing instead to accept as given the City's bald assertions, unsupported
by independent studies or expert testimony, that a substantial
governmental interest exists and that the challenged ordinance
20 3
effectively furthers that interest.
Justice Stevens, perhaps the most dangerous enemy of nonobscene erotic expression on the Court,0 4 writing in concurrence
in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,05 suggested that,
"[wihile a municipality need not persuade a federal court that

199. See supra text accompanying notes 193-97.
200. 391 U.S. at 377.
201. See supra note 69.
202. Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F.2d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
203. 106 S. Ct. at 930-31.
204. Recall that Justice Stevens is the chief purveyor of the "hierarchy of First
Amendment values" theory that entitles non-obscene erotic expression to significantly
less constitutional protection than political or ideological speech. See FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976).
205. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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its zoning decisions are correct as a matter of policy, when First
Amendment interests are implicated it must at least be able to
demonstrate that a uniform policy in fact exists and is applied
in a content-neutral fashion."2 6 This minimal evidentiary requirement of the existence of a "uniform policy" is likewise not
met in Renton. The Renton adult theater zoning ordinance regulates only adult movie theaters; other "adult" businesses (i.e.,
topless bars, massage parlors, and adult bookstores) remain
wholly unrestricted.2 10 Since these other "adult" uses are likely
to have the same potentially-deleterious effects on the surrounding community as adult movie theaters, the Renton ordinance
evidences no overall "scheme" of regulation and no "uniform
policy" tending to support the City's claim that a substantial
governmental interest in fact exists and that the challenged ordinance actually serves to further that interest.
The Renton majority draws broad support from a passage in
Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc.20 8 stating that "[a]
city's interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life
is one that must be accorded high respect. Moreover, the city
must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with
solutions to admittedly serious problems."2 0 9 However, the Renton majority ignores the surrounding circumstances which supported upholding the challenged Detroit zoning ordinance in
Young. Detroit's ordinance was part of an overall scheme of regulation,21 0 enacted only after extensive research was conducted
by the Detroit Common Council.21 (Additionally, the ordinance
did not effect a total ban on adult movie theaters in Detroit;
alternative channels for communication of the restricted expression remained available.2 12 ) In short, Detroit demonstrated that
its zoning ordinance was (at least) designed to further a substantial governmental interest; the Young Court, therefore, properly
allowed it "reasonable opportunity to experiment." The Renton

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 84 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
106 S. Ct. at 931. See supra note 129.
427 U.S. 50 (1976).
Id. at 71.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 54-55, 55 n.8, 71 & n.34.
Id. at 62 & 71 n.35.
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City Council, having made no equivalent demonstration,"' never
"earned" the kind of deference accorded the Detroit Common
Council by the Court in Young.
3.

"Secondary Effects" and the Possibility of Pretext

The third and perhaps single most critical tier of the
O'Brien analysis requires that the governmental interest sought
to be furthered is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.22 4 The purpose of this requirement is to guard against the
possibility of pretext on the part of the government.21 5 Justice
Powell, concurring in Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc.,21 6
warned that "courts must be alert to the possibility of direct
rather than incidental effect of zoning on expression, and especially to the possibility of using the power to zone as a pretext
21 7
for suppressing expression.
The temptation to invoke disingenuous justifications for
speech-restrictive measures is great. Indeed, "restrictions on free
expression are seldom defended on the ground that the state
simply didn't like what the defendant was saying: reference will
generally be made to some danger beyond the message, such as
the danger of riot, unlawful action, or violent overthrow of the
government.2 12 Any proferred justification - even, it appears,
a spurious one - may breathe life into an otherwise prima facie
unconstitutional regulation. 1 9
In Renton, the majority accepted the district court's finding
that the City's "predominate concerns" were with the "secondary effects" of adult movie theaters on the surrounding community and not with the suppression of the expression contained in
213. 106 S. Ct. at 935-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
214. 391 U.S. at 377.
215. See supra note 70.
216. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
217. Id. at 84 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
218. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496 (1975). See also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("[G]overnment may not grant
the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.").
219. See Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F.2d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1983) (supporting the
proposition that zoning decisions explicitly made for the purpose of restricting protected
speech violate the first amendment).

33

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:251

adult films. 22 0 However, the structure of the ordinance itself

fairly demands the opposite conclusion. The Renton ordinance is
directed only at adult movie theaters; other "adult" uses with
predictably similar effects on the surrounding community remain unrestricted. 221 This "underinclusiveness"2

22

compromises

the City's claim that the ordinance is in fact aimed at the "secondary effects" of adult movie theaters on the surrounding
community.223
A zoning ordinance truly aimed at the "secondary effects"
on a surrounding community would attempt to address all the
types of businesses known (or reasonably believed) to create
such "secondary effects." Any less inclusive ordinance would be
ineffective. This is not meant to suggest that, for Renton's ordinance to be constitutionally permissible, it must cover every
conceivable kind of deleterious urban land use; rather, it is suggested that an ordinance which restricts only adult motion picture theaters, which is not part of an overall scheme of regulation, and which seeks to justify such restrictions on the basis of
"secondary effects" on the surrounding community, should raise
some degree of judicial suspicion with regard to its advertised
goals. This is the purpose of O'Brien tier three: to ferret out governmental pretext with regard to restrictions on speech. The
fundamental failure of the Renton Court is its inability (or unwillingness) to recognize such pretext.
The suspicion of pretext created by "singling out" adult
movie theaters for regulation is strengthened further by the fact
that the Renton ordinance effectively bans those theaters from
220. 106 S. Ct. at 929 (emphasis in original).
221. Id. at 934 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Other motion picture theaters, and other forms of "adult entertainment," such as
bars, massage parlors, and adult bookstores, are not subject to the same restrictions. This selective treatment strongly suggests that Renton was interested not in
controlling the "secondary effects" associated with adult businesses, but in discriminating against adult theaters based on the content of the films they exhibit.

Id.
222. See supra note 129.
223. The City's claim is further compromised by the fact that no other "adult" businesses existed in the City of Renton at the time of enactment of the challenged zoning
ordinance. 106 S. Ct. at 931-33. Adult movie theaters, therefore, appear to have been
purposely "singled out" for regulation from an extensive menu of hypothetically deleterious "adult" land uses. For the majority's treatment of this issue, see supra text accompanying note 131.
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Renton's borders by eliminating nearly all of the land in Renton
as potential sites for adult movie theaters.22 4 This overreaching
on the City's part, combined with the laser-like scope of the
challenged zoning ordinance, provides cogent evidence that Renton's actual goal was the total suppression of adult films in that
city. Where the possibility for pretext exists and the "legitimate" governmental interests at stake are evidenced only by
broad, unsubstantiated assertions,2 25 a speech-restrictive ordinance should not be allowed to stand. The Renton Court therefore erred by failing to properly disqualify the City's adult theater zoning ordinance under the vital third criterion of the
O'Brien analysis.2 2 6
4. Alternative Channels for Communication of the Restricted Expression
The fourth and final tier of O'Brien requires that the incidental restriction on speech be no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of the asserted governmental interest.2127 In Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,22 the Court explained this requirement: "While the First
Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places,
a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate. 2 2 9 Even Justice
Stevens, writing in Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc.,230
recognized that "the First Amendment will not tolerate the total

224. 106 S. Ct. at 937-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
225. Recall that the City conducted no independent research and heard no expert
testimony before enacting the adult theater zoning ordinance. There was some question
as to whether the City even reviewed the results of research studies in Seattle and Detroit, on which it purportedly relied, before enacting the zoning ordinance at issue in
Renton. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
226. Compare the situation in Renton with Detroit's similar problem in Young v.
American Mini-Theatres, Inc. "It is clear both from the chronology and from the facts
that Detroit has not embarked on an effort to suppress free expression. The ordinance
was already in existence, and its purposes clearly set out, for a full decade before adult
establishments were brought under it." Young, 427 U.S. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring).
227. 391 U.S. at 377.
228. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
229. Id. at 812 (citation omitted).
230. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic
value."23 1
The relevant inquiry is, therefore, what constitutes "total
suppression"? 32 When do remaining channels of communication
become "inadequate"? 2 3 The Renton Court viewed its decision
in Young as controlling, but a comparative study of the two
cases reveals significant differences.
First, the Young Court noted that "[tihere is no claim that
distributors or exhibitors of adult films are denied access to the
market or, conversely, that the viewing public is unable to satisfy its appetite for sexually-explicit fare. 2 34 According to the
Young Court, the Detroit zoning ordinance left the adult theater
industry largely untouched. "Viewed as an entity, the market for
'235
this commodity is essentially unrestrained.
In Renton, however, Playtime Theatres, Inc. did claim denial of access to the market as a direct result of the City's adult
theater zoning ordinance. 3 8 Moreover, the ordinance, which
plainly eliminates at least ninety-five percent of the total land
37
area of the City of Renton for use as adult movie theater sites,
places significant restrictions on the adult theater industry in
that city. In 1976, the Young Court recognized that "[tihe situation would be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of
'2 38
suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech.
Ten years later, the Renton Court all but forgot this essential,
2 39
qualifying phrase.

231. Id. at 70.
232. Id.
233. 466 U.S. at 812.
234. 427 U.S. at 62.
235. Id.
236. 106 S. Ct. at 932.
237. Id. It was conceded that 95% of the total land area of Renton has been eliminated as potential sites for adult theaters due to the adult theater zoning ordinance. The
remaining five percent was found by the district court to be available, but the theater
owners claimed that even this land is unsuitable or unavailable for use as adult movie
theater sites. Id.
238. 427 U.S. at 71 n.35.
239. Justice Powell, concurring in Young, observed:
Detroit has silenced no message, has invoked no censorship, and has imposed no
limitation upon those who wish to view [adult films] ....Nor is there any significant overall curtailment of adult movie presentations, or the opportunity for a
message to reach an audience .... [11f a sufficient market exists to support them
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The rough guidelines laid out in Young force the conclusion
that the Renton ordinance, which bans adult movie theaters
from at least ninety-five percent of the total land area of that
city, is more restrictive than necessary to further the asserted
governmental interest (i.e., to preserve the quality of life in the
community). The ordinance fails to leave open ample alternative
channels for exhibition of the restricted matter, and, therefore,
fails under the fourth O'Brien criterion.
C. In Defense of O'Brien
The arguments developed in the immediately preceding
subsections have relied upon a "strong" reading of the four
O'Brien criteria.2 4 0 A "strong" reading may be defined as one in
which each of the four criteria is taken at its full face value, one
in which the requisite inquiries are actually made by a reviewing
court, one in which an interested party's conclusory statements
are not asked to substitute for the reasoned findings of an impartial judicial body. It can never be enough to merely accept
(as did the Renton Court) a bald governmental assertion that a
challenged regulation actually serves to further a permissible,
substantial interest of that government. Instead, the court must
make reasoned findings based on all the evidence properly
before it: first, that the asserted interest is constitutionally permissible, genuine, and substantial; and second, that the challenged regulation in fact serves to further that interest." 1

the number of adult movie theaters in Detroit will remain approximately the
same, free to purvey the same message.
Id. at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring).
Compare the "effects" described in the above quoted passage with the effects of the
Renton adult theater zoning ordinance on the adult theater industry in that city.
240. 391 U.S. at 377. See supra notes 187-239 and accompanying text.
241. Professor Redish favors a single standard of judicial scrutiny for both contentbased and content-neutral regulations. See supra note 191. However, at least with regard
to content-neutral regulations, Redish's "unified standard" concept amounts to little
more than a "strong" reading of O'Brien at points:
First, when the test asks whether the government interest is "compelling," it
means exactly that - not in the sense that the term has been distorted in modern equal protection analysis to effectively mean a standard incapable of compliance, but in the common sense interpretation of the word: a matter of truly vital
and important concern. Thus, government inconvenience or difficulty in dealing
with certain kinds of expression is insufficient to justify regulation.
Redish, supra note 52, at 144 (footnote omitted).
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Although the O'Brien analysis is not a "balancing test" per
se, a "strong" reading of it necessarily requires some weighing of
its four discrete, but interrelated, parts.24 A less-than-compelling demonstration of the existence of a substantial governmental interest,2 4 3 for example, may be offset by a finding that alternate avenues for communication of the restricted expression
abound.2 "4 Or, as some members of the Young Court recognized,
the total unavailability of alternative channels may work to disqualify even an ordinance which is justified by a real and sub45
stantial governmental interest.
The single most important advantage of a "strong" reading
of O'Brien, however, is that it refuses to let the test be reduced
to a mere formality, an imprimatur of purportedly content-neutral regulations which restrict constitutionally-protected expression. So long as O'Brien remains good law, courts must be held
to a "strong", meaningful reading of the four-part test developed therein. The first amendment, protector of our most cherished rights, requires no less.
V.

Conclusion

Renton signals a new, relaxed standard of judicial scrutiny
for viewpoint-neutral 6 regulations which impose restrictions on
242. "The test nowhere asks whether the asserted governmental interest is sufficiently 'substantial' to justify the 'incidental' impact on free expression. Under these
conditions, it is practically inconceivable that an asserted governmental purpose will not
qualify." Redish, supra note 52, at 127. Redish's narrow reading of O'Brien reduces the
four-part test to meaninglessness. In order to have any probative value at all - which
we must assume the O'Brien analysis was designed to have - the four parts of the
O'Brien test must be considered as a whole, and the substantiality of the asserted governmental interest must be considered in light of the extent to which the challenged
regulation incidentally restricts speech.
243. See supra notes 200-13 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 227-39 and accompanying text.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 231, 234-35, & 238.
246. See supra notes 21, 23-26 and accompanying text. Since the Renton ordinance
is properly viewed as a subject-matter restriction, and since such subject-matter restrictions are neither clearly content-based nor content-neutral, it seems as if the Renton
decision may prove even more dangerous than it appears on its face. Not only does the
Renton Court relax the standard of judicial review for content-neutral restrictions on
speech, it also implicitly relaxes the standard for subject-matter restrictions which are
neither clearly content-based nor content-neutral. To emphasize Renton's potentially
wide-sweeping effects, the affected legislation is herein termed viewpoint-neutral rather
than content-neutral.
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the freedom of speech guaranteed by the first amendment. By
accepting as fact the proposition that the Renton adult theater
zoning ordinance furthers some substantial or compelling governmental interest, even in the absence of any showing by the
City either that any such interest exists or that the ordinance as
enacted will effectively further that interest, the Supreme Court
has abdicated its responsibility as guardian of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.24 7 The Court's failure to

require the City to establish the requisite substantial governmental interest, compounded by its failure to measure that interest against the extent of the resulting restrictions on expression, reduces the four-part O'Brien analysis to
48
meaninglessness.
Similarly, the Court's reliance on the "secondary effects" rationale as a justification for intrusions on first amendment freedoms is misguided. Carried to its logical end, this reasoning
could be employed to ban controversial public political debate
on the ground that the "secondary effects" of such debate on the
community (i.e., crowds, littering, and safety problems) would be
undesirable. Moreover, it is too likely that resort to a "secondary
effects" justification would often serve as a pretext for quashing
unpopular views and banning "offensive" forms of expression.
Such a result is antagonistic to the basic precepts upon which
2 4'
our Constitution is built.

Finally, Renton demonstrates the danger of allowing any judicial or legislative body to develop a "hierarchy" of speech values and to "assign" appropriate degrees of first amendment protection to different kinds of speech. While erotic expression may
not be as essential to our society as political or ideological
speech, 50 in the absence of a showing that the restricted material is unprotected "obscene" expression, it is improper for a
court, a legislature, or even a majority of the people to dictate
what is and what is not important or valuable expression. The
Constitution aspires to protect us from such majoritarian cen-

247. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
250. I leave room open here for those persons who might argue, convincingly, that
much political speech is utterly without social value.

39

290

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:251

sorship, but it cannot do so without the support of a vigilant and
impartial Supreme Court.
William M. Sunkel
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